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Removasl from the UK - Secretory of State for Home Department powers of Removal - Abuse and development of Jurisprudince on the removal issue. the followign extract from a recent case of High Court (THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SHAHBAZ ALI [2014] EWHC 3967 (Admin) ) is a very good summary of the Jurisprudance, Scope of JR, removal poweres and it use and abuse and the evidential framework for any success in a JR application....

 

The trail starts with the celebrated decision of the House of Lords in Khawaja [1984] AC 74. In that case, the court was primarily considering the approach which it ought to adopt in an application for judicial review in circumstances where the alternative was removal of the appellant from the jurisdiction for an out of country appeal in front of what was then an immigration adjudicator. The House of Lords decided that the consequence for the person (then in detention) of removal from the jurisdiction were so draconian that the High Court had to exercise full jurisdiction to ensure that the precedent facts which were relied upon by the immigration officers to justify such an extreme executive decision were properly established. See, in particular, per Lord Wilberforce at paragraph 39; Lord Scarman at paragraph 57 and Lord Bridge at 106-108. They reached this decision even though Lord Fraser rejected (at paragraph 14) any suggestion that the out of country right of appeal to the adjudicator was a 'worthless' one.

The Court of Appeal then further considered this decision in the case of R(Lim) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 733. That case concerned a decision by the Secretary of State to remove the claimants under section 10(1)(a) of the 1999 Act on the basis that they had worked in breach of condition. There were two issues before the Court of Appeal. The first was whether the Secretary of State was required to prove to a high standard and to the court's satisfaction the 'precedent fact' that there had been breach of condition, or whether the court had merely to be satisfied that the Secretary of State had reached a reasonable decision on this issue. The second issue was whether the court should refuse the application on the basis that Mr Lim had an alternative remedy, in his out-of-country right of appeal.

Sedley LJ, giving the judgment of the court, held that there were some material facts upon which the application of section 10 depended which it could not be said were questions for the immigration officer to determine, subject only to out-of-country right of appeal. For example, the section permits only removal of a person who is a British citizen. If an immigration officer made a section 10 decision in the mistaken belief that the person concerned was not a British citizen, or on the basis of mistaken identity, the High Court would have unfettered power to determine such questions. It could not be said that the person could raise those questions perfectly adequately in an out-of-country appeal.

However, the question of whether or not the conditions of leave had in fact been observed were not in the same category. While there was no clear line to be drawn between questions of precedent fact and others, questions such as whether or not a person was working, and if so, in the wrong place, or whether what was done amounted to deception, must be held as properly falling within the mechanism for appeals under section 84 of the 2002 Act. Sedley LJ held (at [21]) that it would be impossible to find otherwise without disregarding the manifest purpose of section 82 of the 2002 Act. He concluded (at [22]) that:

"The only coherent solution, it seems to me, is to continue to regard every question arising under section 10 as in principle both appealable and reviewable ...but to calibrate the use of judicial review, through the exercise of judicial discretion, to the nature of the issue or issues. In this way – and in so far as I can see, in no other way – the High Court can remain loyal to what was decided in Khawaja by consistently retaining jurisdiction to determine the existence of preconditions of liability to removal, as well as other questions of law apt for the High Court's determination, but can also respect the policy of section 82 by declining to entertain challenges on issues more apt for the appeal mechanism, whatever its hardships."

Sedley LJ (at paragraphs 22-25) recognised that it was important that the exercise of that discretion be exercised with reasonable consistency and predictability, so that two individuals with similar claims should not find that one is heard and the other is turned away (and, he might have added, so that needless time and public money are not spent in contested turf wars as to whether a challenge should proceed in tribunal system or the Administrative Court). He held that while there was no precise yardstick, or necessary or logical cut-off as to issues of fact, such issues were rarely likely in practice to escape the adverse exercise of discretion, since otherwise the courts would empty Parliament's prescribed appeal procedure of content. The Court of Appeal held that the first instance judge in that case, whilst naturally sympathetic to claimants where the decision-making appeared somewhat thin, had erred in proceeding to determine the application by way of judicial review.

The matter was considered again by the Court of Appeal in R (RK (Nepal)) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 359. That was a claim in which the Claimants, who had leave to remain as students, were served with section 10 decisions when they were found to have been working for more than the 20 hours per week permitted in the conditions of their leave to enter and remain. Permission to challenge that decision by way of judicial review was refused, and a renewal application was made to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal also refused the application. Aikens LJ emphasised at paragraph 33 that the courts must respect the legislative framework put in place by Parliament, whereby immigration decisions attracting a right of appeal under section 82 of the 2002 Act were not open to challenge in the courts by way of judicial review unless there were 'special or exceptional factors' at play. He held that the facts in the RK case were not sufficiently 'special or exceptional'; that the contested questions fell squarely within section 10(1), and that it made no difference to that decision that the Secretary of State might instead have made a decision to curtail the applicants' leave thus bringing the decision to remove into the in-country right of appeal under section 82(2)(e) of the 2002 Act in a case where:

"there is no challenge …to the fact that the decision to remove was made under section 10".

The two routes of appeal were 'distinct' and 'must not be blurred' (see para 36). RK, however, as Aikens LJ observed at paragraph 35, was a claim in which there was no challenge to the exercise of discretion to use the power under section 10 of the 1999 Act at all.

 

In R (Anwar & Adjo) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1275, the Court of Appeal gave further consideration to the question of what constituted special and exceptional circumstances. In one of the cases, a Ms Pengeyo, had been enrolled at an institution which was (at the time of her enrolment there) considered by the SSHD to be a bona fide educational provider, but was later found to be issuing bogus qualifications. Ms Pengeyo had sought advice from the Home Office and been told to seek another provider, which she did. The SSHD nonetheless decided to remove her from the UK on the basis that had obtained leave to remain by deception. The tribunal later found that Ms Pengeyo had been acting honestly throughout, and indeed there had been no evidence upon which it could have been found that she had acted dishonestly. The adverse decision was reached 'out of the blue' without an opportunity for Ms Pengeyo to present her case. (I interpolate that this would appear to be contrary to the position which must be adopted in respect of those perceived to be illegal entrants, who must, as a matter of fairness, be given an opportunity to be heard before such an adverse decision is taken: R Uluyol) v An Immigration Officer (CO/1960/00) per Gage J)).

In the Pengeyo and Anwar cases, the AIT had held that the respective immigration judges had acted without jurisdiction in reaching conclusions in the case, because the appeals ought not to have been permitted to start on an in-country basis. Sedley LJ held (at [19]), that this was an error. The judges had had jurisdiction to embark upon the hearings unless and until the point was taken by the Home Office, at which point, it acted as a jurisdictional bar. Ms Pengeyo's judicial review did not, in fact, need to proceed (because by the time of the Court of Appeal hearing, the Home Office accepted that she was not guilty of deceit and had withdrawn its removal decision). However, Sedley LJ observed at paragraph 24 that

"In the judicial review proceedings …. A challenge was made to the decision of the Home Secretary to use the deception route, enabling her effectively to stifle any appeal, rather than the variation route carrying a right of in-country appeal. Judge Thornton QC rightly in my judgment, granted permission to argue this. Had it been sought, permission would also have properly been granted to argue that the election of the Home Office, having used the deception route, to take the out-of- country point in order to stifle an appeal was a serious abuse of power. Once it is established that the point is good only when taken to take it in order to prevent the exposure of a shameful decision – the effective criminalising and enforced removal of an innocent person without either worthwhile evidence or the opportunity to answer – is without doubt justiciable by way of judicial review".

Pausing at that point in the review of the caselaw, that observation of Sedley LJ, albeit an obiter dictum in my view lends support to an argument, which is in any event a necessary consequence of the Khawaja decision, that judicial review is always available as a remedy where the court concludes that the use of section 10 and the out-of-country route rather than a curtailment or refusal decision which triggers the in-country right of appeal, constitutes an abuse of power.

Although I of course appreciate that grounds of appeal under section 84 of the 2002 Act can include an erroneous exercise of discretion, I consider that where the allegation is not one of mistake, but one of abuse, the jurisdiction of the High Court must be available and capable of being exercised in practice if the alternative is to subject the affected person to a real detriment. As the House of Lords noted in Khawaja, being required to leave the jurisdiction is such a detriment, notwithstanding the continuing availability of a genuine and worthwhile right of appeal.

Nonetheless, in fidelity to the legislative scheme of the 2002 Act, the High Court should only be prepared to exercise that jurisdiction in truly 'special' or 'exceptional' circumstances, such as – for example – a compelling basis for considering there has been an abuse of process. The mere fact that some inconvenience will result from being required to leave the jurisdiction is not in itself 'special' or 'exceptional': it is inherent in the scheme.

The next decision in time is that in Thapa, which was handed down on 11 March 2014. In that case, a young Nepalese student was observed on one occasion in the kitchen of a restaurant, in which he had previously (lawfully) worked part-time while studying. Since that time, his leave had been varied so he was no longer entitled to work. It was said that he was working in breach of his leave. He was served with a section 10 removal decision and detained pending removal. There was no evidence either in the contemporaneous papers or the witness evidence that the immigration officers concerned had appreciated that they had a discretion to enforce other than by way of a removal decision, nor that they had exercised any such discretion having perceived such a breach.

The EIG at para 50.5.2 said that in order for a removal decision to be made in such circumstances, the breach must 'be of sufficient gravity' to warrant such action. It said that there must be 'firm and recent evidence', normally within six months of working in breach, including one of – an admission under caution by the offender of working in breach; a statement by the employer implicating the suspect; documentary evidence such as payslips, the offender's details on the pay roll, NI records, tax records or a P45; and sight by the IP or a police officer, preferably on two or more separate occasions, or on one occasion over an extended period, or of wearing the employer's uniform, in practice, generally backed up by other evidence. None of this evidence existed in that case.

Mrs Justice Swift and Mr Justice Walker had been asked in written submissions for the Secretary of State to refuse permission to proceed by way of judicial review, on the basis that a suitable alternative remedy was available in the form of an out of country right of appeal. However, they had granted permission. On the basis of the decision of Sir Thayne Forbes in R (Alapati) v SSHD [2009] EWHC 3712 (Admin) the Claimant submitted that I ought not to refuse to entertain the substantive application on the basis that this issue had already been decided at the permission stage. I regarded the decisions of Swift and Walker JJ as 'highly persuasive' factors in persuading me to consider the substantive questions of law before me. Perhaps foolishly, I added three reasons of my own.

The first (at [41]-[43]) was that I regarded this as a challenge, not to the decision under section 10 of the 1999 Act, but to the prior decision as to whether to adopt this (rather than some other, or no) enforcement action. This I regarded as a situation distinguishable from Lim, and expressly envisaged as raising different issues in RK (Nepal), because it was a question of the process through which the discretion was exercised to proceed down a route generating only an out-of-country right of appeal, and although the First Tier Tribunal might have considered these questions during the course of any such appeal, the issue was not one equally capable of resolution in the FTT. I formed this view because the Administrative Court could offer a more satisfactory remedy for an abusive choice of route, whereas the FTT could only have made a declaration to this effect after the event. As I could have said – though I did not express it in that way – this appeared to me to be an arguable case about the abuse of the power to make a section 10 decision in circumstances in which it was plainly against the Secretary of State's own policy to do so, rather than a question of whether the conclusion reached under section 10 as to whether the claimant in that case was in fact working in breach of condition, or how serious that breach was.

Secondly (at [44]), I found that that question was one where I was not convinced that the statutory appeal procedure could in fact provide a suitable alternative remedy given the nature of the challenge in that case (i.e. unlawful/unfair, or – I might have said – abusive, exercise of discretion in choice of enforcement mechanism, unfairly consigning the appellant to an out of country right of appeal).

Thirdly, at [45], I was persuaded by the reasoning of Walker J that the wider public importance and consequently the importance of a swift determination was a factor (though of course not the only factor) which ought to influence my exercise of discretion to keep the claim in the High Court.

I distinguished that case from the decision of Ali Zahid v SSHD [2013] EWHC 4290, in which Coulson J rejected an application for judicial review on the basis that there was a suitable alternative remedy in the FTT. I noted that the question of abuse of power/exceptionality was not run in that case, and also that the evidential requirements in the EIG were plainly made out in the very different circumstances of that claim.

There was no appeal against the Thapa decision. On the basis of the substantive findings in that case, the EIG was changed so that officers must now demonstrate that they have considered whether a particular case is an appropriate one for the exercise of discretion to proceed under s10 of the 1999 Act, and so that the specific statement of reasons for the decision is given in more detail than was hitherto the case. (I was shown a document which evidenced the exercise of discretion in the present case).

However, very soon after it was handed down, the exercise of discretion to hear the matter by way of judicial review in Thapa was disapproved by a 3-judge Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, presided over by Bean J as he then was. This was in a renewed permission application in the case of R (Bilal Jan) v SSHD. Jan was another case in which a student was encountered working in breach of his conditions of leave. Permission was sought on the basis that there was no firm evidence that he was working in breach and that in any event the alleged breach was not of sufficient gravity to warrant his removal. The Defendant's contemporaneous record of evidence in that case (albeit disputed) was that the Claimant had been interviewed under caution and admitted working.

On the basis of Thapa, it was submitted for the Claimant in Jan that there was no evidence that the Defendant had considered the exercise of discretion under section 10 before the removal decision was reached. Again, that was disputed by the Secretary of State, who pointed out (at 21) that both the interview note and the terms of the notice of the removal decision showed that the decision-maker was aware that there was a discretion, and that these were circumstances in which she was entitled, on the basis of her published policy, to find that this was a proper case for removal.

As to whether the in-country right of appeal constituted a suitable alternative remedy, the Defendant relied upon R (RK (Nepal)) and Lim to submit that there were no appropriately special or exceptional factors in the Bilal Jan case justifying proceeding by way of judicial review. It was submitted by the Secretary of State that Thapa was wrongly decided on the issue of availability of judicial review and should not be followed.

The Upper Tribunal rejected the submissions that there was no evidence of exercise of discretion. The Upper Tribunal appeared (at [24]) to read Thapa as formulating a general principle that to act lawfully, a decision-maker must in every case expressly explain why a particular enforcement route had been followed and why alternative routes had not been followed. I certainly did not intend to express myself in such general terms. Thapa was decided in a case where nothing existed to suggest that the officials had even considered the exercise of discretion; in a case that on its face did not appear to be repeated or significant; where there was clear evidence of breach of the criteria in the EIG as to circumstances in which a removal decision would be made; and where no explanation was recorded as to why that was so. It was in those circumstances that I found that there should have been such recording of facts as to enable the court to satisfy itself that there had been a fair exercise of discretion to follow the section 10 route.

Jan was a very different case because, as the Upper Tribunal noted (at paragraph [25]), the contemporaneous interview record did give reasons which demonstrated a clear admission of work, in accordance with chapter 50.6 of the EIG. Those facts were to be taken as given since judicial review (as opposed to a statutory appeal) was not generally an appropriate forum for resolving disputed issues of fact. Moreover, the Upper Tribunal held (at paragraphs [26] and [28]) that the evidence in Jan satisfied the Upper Tribunal that the decision makers were clearly aware that they had a discretion. It was in that context that the Upper Tribunal held (at [29]) that the notice of decision and reasons given were adequate to indicate why the decision was taken, and that there was no need to have any express reference to why the discretion was exercised to make a removal decision.

Indeed, the Upper Tribunal in Jan distinguished Thapa where there were such special factors, and where the evidence which might have been advanced in response went beyond a bare denial.

At paragraphs 35-43, the Upper Tribunal considered the question of whether the tribunal on an out-of-country appeal offered a suitable alternative remedy. It reviewed the Lim, RK (Nepal) and Thapa cases. The Upper Tribunal held (at [37]) that the distinction in the Thapa case between the challenge to a decision under section 10 of the 1999 Act and a prior decision to proceed under it was not a good basis for distinguishing that which the FTT could decide and that which the Administrative Court could decide, because it overlooked the fact that the FTT has jurisdiction to consider issues relating to fairness and failure to appreciate a discretion, on the basis that the decision was 'not in accordance with law'. It held, therefore, at [40]-[42], that I had been wrong to take the view that the facts in Thapa raised issues falling outside the jurisdiction of the FTT, or that such issues were special or exceptional per se. The fact that it would be too late by the time the matter was considered by the FTT to prevent an in-country remedy having been given applied to all out of country appeals, and this could not constitute a special factor.

At paragraph 42 of its decision, the Upper Tribunal in Jan held that the fact that a question was one of general public importance was not an issue which could justify a matter being heard by way of judicial review.

These authorities were again considered by Green J in R (Khan) v SSHD [2014] EWHC 2494 (Admin). After a careful survey of the authorities, Green J noted (at [67]) that he agreed with the reasoning and logic in Jan which he considered better reflected the analysis and guidance of the appellate courts.

Having considered the decisions of the Upper Tribunal in Jan and the Administrative Court in Khan with great respect, I still consider that the exercise of discretion in the Thapa case was the right one in the circumstances of that case.

Doubtless due to deficiencies in the way it was expressed, the Upper Tribunal in Jan read my observations on the exercise of discretion in that case rather more broadly than I intended them to be read. In particular, I did not intend to suggest a rigid distinction between decisions as to whether to use section 10 and those under it. As Sedley LJ observed in Lim, the dividing lines in this area cannot be clearly drawn.

As to the nature of the decision under challenge in that case, the point I was seeking to draw out was that Thapa was more properly seen as a case about abuse of process in the determination of which enforcement route to pursue than a case going to the legal and factual merits of the decision in a narrower sense. I saw Thapa as a case in which nothing suggested to me that the decision-maker had considered the exercise of discretion as to which route to pursue; nor had she recognised the fact that the evidence required by the EIG before using that enforcement route (with its out of country right of appeal) did not exist (see [65]). She had not decided that this was a case in which use of this enforcement route was justified even though it departed from her expressed policy: she simply had not accepted that it was a departure from that policy. This was different from Ali Zahid and from the decision in Jan. It was for that reason that I considered that the nature of the challenge militated against forcing the case into the FTT route. I ought perhaps, using the language of Anwar, to have indicated that I regarded it as an abuse of power case.

I was well aware that 'other error of law' was a ground for review in the FTT, so I did not consider that the matter was simply outside the jurisdiction of that tribunal. But, given the nature of the concern in the circumstances of the Thapa case, I did not consider it one equally capable of resolution by the FTT or the Administrative Court, nor one in which the Administrative Court ought to concede what the House of Lords in Khawaja called its 'jealously guarded' supervisory power. Given the serious question of abuse of power in forcing the decision down the out-of-country appeal route on the facts of that case, I considered the question "more apt for the supervisory jurisdiction of [the Administrative] Court", given that otherwise the claim might have been 'unlawfully or unfairly' consigned to the out-of-country route. The observations of Mr Justice Walker on general public importance, coupled with the fact that the two publicly funded parties had come prepared to argue the full case (the Claimant having been granted permission to do so after a contested permission application) were of some significance as a factor in the exercise of discretion, but would not have persuaded me to accept jurisdiction on their own.

I regard Thapa as a case in which it was appropriate to consider the matter by way of judicial review, given (a) the fact that two judges had considered the issue and granted permission; and (b) that in effect that was an abuse of power case. Given the complete failure of the Defendant to evidence any regard to her own guidance as to the strength of evidence required, or to recognise the distinction between finding that the Claimant was working and a deciding to remove, I consider that it was an abuse case of the kind for which Sedley LJ in Anwar would have given permission for judicial review. I see it as one of the 'special and exceptional cases' envisaged in Lim and in RK(Nepal) at [35] which is a true challenge to the fairness of the process by which the decision to proceed under s10 of the 1999 Act was reached, rather than an attack on the legal or factual merits of the decision taken under that section. I agree with the Upper Tribunal in Jan and Coulson J in Ali Zahid that neither of those was a case which contained any such special and exceptional factors. I recognise, as did Sedley LJ in Lim, that there is no clear line demarcating the two cases. But I regard Thapa as distinguishable, rather than a departure from, the Lim and RK decisions as applied in Jan and Ali Zahid.

It is also perhaps significant that these were all 'breach of condition' cases under section 10(1)(a) of the 1999 Act, rather than 'deceit' cases under section 10(1)(b). In relation to deceit, the relevant section of the EIG (which I have cited at paragraph 21 above), understandably does not focus so strongly on factors to take into account in deciding whether the use of section 10 is justified, but rather, on the strength of evidence to be obtained before so serious a finding is made.

 

 

Updates on Evidential Flexibility Policy, Para 245AA of the Immigration Ruels, Admissibility of Post decision evidence under Section 85A of the Immigration Act

 

The Supreme Court will be examining this complex issue of Evidential Flexibility in the coming months; permission having been granted on 19 May 2014 in Rodriguez (now called Mandalia). On the other hand, after being overturned in the Court of Appeal the Upper Tribunal have rencently made a full u-turn on these complex issue inthe following three reported cases.

 

Durrani (Entrepreneurs: bank letters; evidential flexibility) [2014] UKUT 295 (IAC)

Akhter and another (paragraph 245AA: wrong format) [2014] UKUT 297 (IAC)

Fayyaz (Entrepreneurs: paragraph 41-SD(a)(i) – “provided to”) [2014] UKUT 296 (IAC)

 

The aare not, therefore, the last word we will see on the subject.  We have to wait for the Supreme court decision in Rodriguez (now called Mandalia) which will be the last word subject to exception on the grounds of distinction if facts and introduction and subsequest changes to para 245AA of the immigration Rules.

 

 

Good News.... another Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Appeals Allowed today.

(Last updated on 17/09/2014)

 

This was an interesting appeal. The Ft judge accepted our submission that if the Interview record does not record completely when the application is interviewed as part of genuineness test under the Immigration Rules Tier  Entrepreneur, then the Tribunal shall not give full weight to the same and shall not take it against the appellant even though  the appellant answers are not complete.

 

The Tribunal also accepted our argument on the point that the Home Office has no power to go behind the commercial decision of a Venture Capital to offer investment.  

 

 

 

 

Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) visa fresh Upper Tribunal Reported Case.

Shebl (Entrepreneur: proof of contracts) [2014] UKUT 216 (IAC)

 

Finally the Upper Tribunal has laid down it first reported decision in an Tier 1(Entrepreneur) appeal. the Upper Tribunal held that the requirement to prove the existence of “contracts” in paragraph 41-SD of Appendix A to the immigration rules does not itself require the contracts in question to be contained in documents. There is, however, a need for such contracts to be evidenced in documentary form. Relying on this case, we at Ikon have recently argued before the Tribunal that the failure to submit another mandatory documents like CT41G, Current Appointment Report, Advertisements and/or Marketing materials, HMRC documents, Letter from the Legal Representative, Third Party Declarations etc. etc, not necessarily give the Home Office a right to refuse the applicants' Tier 1(entrepreneur) Applications if the Applicant has submitted any other alternative evidence to prove that the existence of the Specified Documents in the Appendix A of the Immigration Rules.

 

If you are not sure and need help with your application or your appeal, our expert immigration solicitors will be more than happy to offer expert advice and support and can be contacted on 0121-327 6927 or 07977700137 and ask for Mr. khan who is expert immigration lawyer and have successfully represented clients in Tier 1 (entrepreneur) appeals. Alternatively, contact us by email at mail@ikonlaw.co.uk or visit our website now for further information and clients testimonials.

 

 

UK Spouse visa update March 2014

 

Let's remember those who are forced to live apart on this Mother's Day and the upcoming Father's Day by disproportionate immigration rules just because their partners can't earn £18,600. I hope the court of appeal will go a bit further than the High court and declare the rules unlawful.

 

If the Home Office oe Entry Clearance Officer has refused your application to stay or come to the United Kingdom as a spouse of a british citizen or a settle person. You might have strong grounds to appeal to the immigration tribunal and you must consult an experienced and friendly immigration solicitor like Ikon Law  how speak your language. Our immigration solicitors ans lawyer can help and assist you to appeal in the event that your application is refused. We provide services to client all our the UK and we alsos provide advise and assitance to clients from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sari lanka and clients from all others countries in asian, europe, Africa, middle east, australia, russial and america. We provide a highly professional, cost-effective service.

 

For information about the Court of appeal decision plz contact us:

 

 

Immigration Appeals - 2nd February 2014

 

Good News.... Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Appeals Allowed.

 

Ikon Law is proud to announce that until today our immigration solicitors have represented in many Tier  1 Entrepreneur Appeals and Judicial Reviews and we are proud that most of our client Entrepreneur Appeal have been allowd by the Immigration Tribunal. A few days ago we received the Tribunal decision in another Tier 1 Entrepreneur Appeal allowing our client’s Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Appeal. Our client’s Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Appeal was allowed by the Tribunal by finding the Home Office “failed to follow the requirement of Para 245AA and the [flexibility policy. We successfuly argue that the recent Court of Appeal case of SSHD –and-Rodriguez [2014] EWCA Civ 2 is not applicable to our client Tier 1 Entrepreneur Appeal as the Court of Appeal case is regarding the appellant failure to submit bank statements with the Application for maintenance under Appendix A while most of our clients Tier 1 Entrepreneur Appeal are relating to the Home Office failure to contact our clients when there are some missing information from our clients' Tier 1 Entrepreneure Applications wnd therefore we argued that our client Tier 1 Entrepreneur Appeal have been refused unlawfully.

 

Tier 1 Entrepreneur Appeal Update: 17th January 2014

 

Update on Evidential Flexibility Policy

and Rodriguez immigration appeal and Evidential Flexibility

and Tier 1 Entrepreneur Appeal refusal.

 

SSHD –and-Rodriguez [2014] EWCA Civ 2

 

The Court of Appeal has given a clear judgment in the Rodriguez immigration appeal and Evidential Flexibility Policy matter. Though the case was largely decided in favour of the Secretary of State for home department, nevertheless, there is still hope for those who submitted the specifiied documents but failed to comply with the prescriptive requirement of the rules such as document in the wrong format, some missing information from the documents are sending copies instead of original documents to home office.

 

 

 

 

Immigration Appeals - 1st December 2013

 

Has the Home Office refused your application to stay in the United Kingdom? Then they will have sent you an appeal form and guidance notes along with their decision. You may feel you have grounds to appeal to the tribunal and in which case you may want to consult with a specialist immigration solicitor like Ikon Law. Based in Birmingham, its team of experienced legal consultants can help you to appeal in the event that your application is refused. Ikon Law has clients all over the UK, so whether you're in Birmingham, London, Manchester or Bradford get in touch with the team today. When you hire Ikon Law you can rest-assured that you'll receive a highly professional, cost-effective service.

 

Experienced Legal Consultants

 

Whether you need help with your application or your appeal, Ikon Law are best-placed to ensure that you are successful. The team is made up of a number of legal consultants who genuinely care about achieving the best results for you. They are on hand 24/7 to offer expert advice and support and can be contacted by telephone on  0121-327 6927 or by email at mail@ikonlaw.co.uk. To learn more about the company visit the website now.

 

Tackle Tenant Disputes - 24th November 2013

 

Are you a landlord with a problem tenant? Need to evict a tenant? Then get in touch with Ikon Law today. It's never nice to have to evict a tenant but sometimes there's no other option. Perhaps they have damaged your property intentionally or they haven't been paying their rent on time and in full each month. There are many reasons why you might need to evict a tenant and if the time comes then it makes sense to contact Ikon Law. The law relating to evicting a tenant is complex and so it's a good idea to hire an expert landlord solicitors to do the job for you. Ikon Law are one of the most competitively priced law firms in the UK and charge just £299.00 from start to finish.

 

Legal Expertise at Hand

 

The legal aspects of letting out your property can often be confusing and if you're not up to speed on the latest changes in the law then you could inadvertently land yourself in hot water. Fortunately, Ikon Law is there to help when you require a special law firm that's able to adapt to changes in the legal sector. To learn more about the company visit the website now.

 

Immigration Solicitors - 17th November 2013

 

Do you need legal help with an immigration visa application or an immigration appeal, but worry that you can’t afford the costs? Then you need a direct access solicitor, whom you can contact directly with no referral fee – one who specialises in immigration law.

 

Expert Immigration Advice

 

Ikon Law are specialist immigration solicitors based in Birmingham, providing services to clients throughout the UK. Their team are committed to providing you with the best service for the best cost and legal help is worth every penny, as many immigration appeals and visa applications fail when submitted by the applicants themselves - often because some minor legal detail that has been omitted. They offer a free, no obligation initial chat and a competitive, fixed fee will be discussed with you at the start, so that there are no nasty surprises. In suitable cases, a no win, no fee agreement may be offered. Their 24/7 service means you can always contact them via phone or e-mail and speak to an immigration solicitor directly, and they also offer convenient evening and weekend appointments in London, Birmingham and Manchester. Ikon Law have years of experience and a great success rate, so visit their website to discover more about their services.

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